self-organizing system, the city is characterized by phenomena of nonlinearity and uncertainty (Portugali, 1999) . In such circumstances prediction is difficult and agents' decisionmaking and action are based more on cognitive processes, such as bounded rationality, decision heuristics, and agents' cognitive map of the city, and less on the optimization of future outcomes. Three such cognitive processes active in making the city as a representation of itself are discussed below in section 2. This discussion closes by examining a few experiments that illustrate the working of the above capabilities. Section 3 examines several conceptual and methodological obstacles that in the past have prevented a cognitive approach to cities, and section 4 introduces SIRN (Synergetic Inter-Representation Networks) as an approach to cognition and cognitive mapping that enables a cognitive approach to cities. This potential of SIRN is illustrated in section 5 with respect to urban simulation models. The paper concludes with a few notes concerning further research.
Cognition and the city
The discussion in this section starts (section 2.1) by examining the city from the perspective of a cognitive science discourse on categories and categorization. It then proceeds by noting some features that are prominent in the category city but that were overlooked in cognitive science studies of categories. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 further elaborate on`pattern recognition' and`cognitive mapping'ötwo cognitive capabilities that are active in the categorization of cities as well as in their production, reproduction, and dynamics. Section 2.4 illustrates the working of the above cognitive capabilities by looking at the production of small artifacts (lamps) and large artifacts (cities).
Categories, categorization, and cities
In cognitive science the discussion of categories was one of the main catalysts for thè paradigm shift' that the discipline underwentöfrom classical cognitivism to embodied cognition. That is, from cognition seen as the execution of an algorithm on the hardware of the brain, to an ecological, pragmatic, action^perception approach, according to which cognition is embodied (for example, Freeman, 1999; Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987; Varela et al, 1994) . Applied to the phenomena of cities and urbanism (Portugali, 1996; cognitive science theories of categories and categorization produced several findings that concern the nature of cities and their dynamics. The findings that are relevant to`a cognitive approach to cities' are summarized in what follows.
First, looking at the entity city as a cognitive category sheds a new light on a long history of attempts, in urban studies, to categorize the city in order to differentiate between different types of cities or their internal parts (Dear, 2000; Harris, 1997) and to respond to the somewhat confusing question`what is a city?' Contrary to the commonly held view among students of cities and urbanism, that categories such as`city', central business district (CBD)',`residential neighborhood', and the like are sets of instances sharing some necessary and sufficient conditions that define them as a city, CBD, etc, cognitive science theories imply that such urban entities form what Wittgenstein (1953, paragraph 66) has termed a family resemblance categoryö``a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing''. Such family-resemblance categories are further typified by the property that Rosch et al, (1976) have termed prototypicality and basic level. That is, some cities in the family-resemblance network city, or some land uses in the category CBD, are more typical or prototypical of their category than others. The areas and subareas in the simulation model presented below (section 5) are defined in this way.
The view that the city is a family-resemblance category is particularly prominent in light of the fact that cities have existed for more than 5000 years and the fact that during that period cities as well as their prototypes have changed to the extent that there is no common denominator between the`first' and the`last' city but the namè city'. The urban process can thus be seen as a sequence of self-organized urban revolutions that bring new urban culutres with new city forms, prototypes, basic level, and the like (Portugali, 1999) . One outcome of this process is the property of self-similarity and continuity as noted above and discussed below.
Second, according to Johnson's (1987) and Lakoff's (1987) version of embodied cognition, a person's basic bodily experience in the environment entails spatial image schemata, which by means of imagination (metaphors metonymy, etc) , are later in life used to relate to the world and categorize it. Some of the main embodied image schemata they discuss are container, center-periphery, hierarchy, and part^whole. These mental models are identical to models employed by students of urbanism to refer to the structure of cities and regions. In the latter it is taken for granted that such schematic structures are the result of economic, social, or political forces. But from the above-noted identity follows the research hypothesis that cognitive image schemata might also be the original source for the core^periphery and hierarchical structure of cities. That is, these image schemata are not only the means by which we construct our language, as suggested in cognitive science, but also the means by which we perceive, act on, and thus construct, our artificial environmentöspatially, economically, culturally, and politically. The model presented in section 5 illustrates this possibility. It also makes use of its immediate corollaryöthat people are never tabula rasa when coming to a new city; rather, they come equipped with a set of image schemata, and usually also mental models of`a city' constructed in their mind/brain on the basis of their previous experience.
Third, cities are very large and there is a limit to human capacity to memorize such large-scale objects. As a consequence, and as in the case of cognitive mapping (see below), humans tend to overcome this limitation by a hierarchical recategorization of the city into smaller scale categories such as core (CBD), periphery, quarters, neighborhoods, etc. Such recategorization is implemented in two basic ways: by means of the embodied image schemata as noted above and by means of the more legible and information-affording urban elements (Haken and Portugali, 2003; Lynch, 1960) . Recategorization is also a central process in the urban simulation model presented in section 5.
Fourth, cities are artifacts. Like other artifacts, cities are not just objects in the environment that the brain/mind has to recognize and categorize, but are rather a product of a categorization that is implemented by practically making the categories. In such cases the processes of categorization and production are inseparable. Furthermore, cities are very large artifacts and as such are the collective product of a synergetic process involving thousands and millions of participants, each acting locally in a relatively independent manner. The amazing outcome of these, seemingly chaotic, processes are highly ordered and organized artifacts: cities are genuine self-organizing systems (Portugali, 1999) . Despite the enormous amount of planning that is invested in cities, in the last analysis, their global pattern and structure emerge spontaneously`by themselves'öby means of self-organization. The city belongs in this respect to a class of large artifacts or categories that includes`writing',`external-languages' (Chomsky, 1986) , and other categories that together form culture and society. What is specific to such cultural self-organizing categories is that their elementary parts are human agents, each of which is itself a self-organizing system. The result is a double self-organizing process: the agents participate in the self-organization process of the city as a whole, which in its turn participates in the specific self-organization process of each individual agent (Portugali, 1999) . The model developed in section 5 is an attempt to capture this property of cities.
Pattern recognition, cities, and their dynamics
Like many other cognitive tasks, categorization depends on an organism's ability to recognize patterns. The issue thus forms a central research topic in cognitive science. Studies in this domain have revealed that humans have the ability to recognize a whole pattern on the basis of only partial information on it. This cognitive ability was intensively studied in the context of synergetics and forms one of its paradigmatic cornerstones öthe`pattern recognition paradigm' (Haken, 1983) . In a typical patternrecognition experiment, a test person (or a computer) is offered a small portion from a whole pattern and is asked to recognize it out of a repertoire of patterns that are stored in memory. Synergetics has used the analogy of pattern formation in order to offer a theory and algorithm as to how this task is implemented. According to synergetics, the few parts of a pattern offered to the test person enter into interaction out of which, by means of associative memory, an order parameter emerges. The order parameter enslaves the rest of the parts and recognition is established. As shown by Portugali (1990; and Portugali and Haken (1992) , the process of pattern recognition is similar in several ways to the process of cognitive mapping of a city. In the latter, because of the size of cities and similar extended environments, people have to construct a whole pattern in the mind (that is, a cognitive map) on the basis of only partial information on it.
Subsequent studies have extended the above approach to cases of hierarchical structures in pattern recognition (Daffertshofer, 2000) . These new applications employ Kohonen's (1989) `abstract features maps', which refer to a human's capability to recognize classes of patterns, that is, categories. In the context of cities, it means that, when we come for the first time to a city never visited before, we can still recognize its many urban categoriesöneighbourhoods, pavements, buildings, roads, shops, and so onöand the fact that we are confronting`a city' (see Medyckyj-Scott and Blades, 1992) . Such abstract features maps correspond to what will be termed below c-cognitive maps, that is, conceptual or category-like cognitive maps. As will be demonstrated below, c-cognitive and s-cognitive maps are two facets of a single cognitive urban process.
In two recent studies Haken (1996; 1998) suggested an analogy between the processes of pattern recognition and decisionmaking. As in pattern recognition, so in decisionmaking, the deciding agent has to make a judgment about some final situation on the basis of only partial information. The novelty of Haken's theory is that, instead of relaying on some arbitrary axiomatic postulates (such as the economic person), he makes use of what experiments in pattern recognition have revealed about humans' general cognitive abilities. For example, the phenomenon of hysteresis implies that, when equipped with only partial information, a decisionmaking``person does what he or she did last time even under changed circumstances'' (Portugali, 1999, page 278) . Or, when facing a complex pattern-recognition task, a person will tend to act sequentially and hierarchically. Haken and Portugali (1999) have further elaborated the synergetic approach to decisionmaking by linking it to Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) decision heuristics and to the SIRN model (see below).
Cognitive mapping and cities
Humans and animals have the capability to construct in their brain information about the spatial structure of extended environments. The term`extended' refers to portions of the environment that are large to the extent that they cannot be captured in their entirety by direct perception. Such brain/mind constructs have been termed by Tolman (1948) cognitive maps. Subsequent research exposed many properties of cognitive maps: that they are essentially topological and as such are not an exact representation of the external environment; that their construction in the brain is sensitive to certain environmental features or elements; that many parts of the brain are associated with cognitive mapping, but that a specific part of the brainöthe hippocampusöis of special significance (O'Keefe and Nadel, 1978) , and so on (for a survey see Kitchin and Blades, 2002) . But what exactly that cognitive map is is still a matter of debate (Kitchin and Blades, 2002; Liben, 2001; Roberts, 2001) . In what follows I suggest approaching the notion`cognitive map' from the more fundamental debate concerning`What is cognition?' The two basic positions discussed above with respect to categoriesöclassical cognitivism and embodied cognitionöwill be reiterated in this section in relation to cognitive maps. A third position, termed SIRN will be presented below as the preferred approach to the study of cities.
According to classical cognitivism and its`information-processing approach', cognition should be interpreted in terms of the computer metaphor ö that is, as the manipulation of symbols (software) on the hardware of the brain. Accordingly, a cognitive map of a city, for example, is essentially a symbol stored in the brain. Like a computer, the brain encodes information from the environment, processes it, constructs a cognitive map out of it, and stores it in long-term memory as one, among its many, internal representations. Then, in response to some environmental stimulus or cue, the brain/mind retrieves its stored cognitive map to produce behavior or action in the environment. An agent's behavior in the city is thus a response to urban cues that activate the agent's stored cognitive mapöthe agent retrieves and`consults' his or her cognitive map and on the basis of this consultation produces behavior or action. This approach to cognition corresponds to the view of the city as a classical category. Classical cognitivism has dominated cognitive science from its emergence in the mid1950s and is still dominant in many areas, including cognitive mapping (Kitchin and Blades, 2002 , section 2.2).
The notion of`embodied cognition' is used here as a general title for several approaches that since the middle of the 1970s have challenged some of the basic principles of the classical view. One challenge to the classical view came, as we saw above, from studies on categories and categorization. Other criticisms came from the direction of neurosciences and neurocomputation. In particular action^perception, parallel distributed processing, neoconnectionism, and neural network studies have claimed that the brain does not store symbols as static internal representations, but rather constructs them each time anew as task-specific and context-dependent constructs. [The list of references here is rather long. Some of the more prominent studies are those by Edelman (1992) , Freeman (1999) , Haken (1996) , Kelso (1995) , Rumelhart et al (1986) , and Varela et al (1994) . A cognitive map of a city, according to these views, is not a map-like entity internally stored in the`brain's atlas', but rather a dynamic ad-hoc construct produced by the brain in the course of an agent's specific bodily action in a specific urban or environmental context.
It is important at this stage to clarify the similarities and differences between the notion of a cognitive map of a city and the notion of the category city. They are similar in that both are an internal representation of a city. In the view of classical cognitivism they are interpreted as symbols stored in the memory; in the view of embodied cognition they are interpreted as task-specific and context-dependent ad-hoc entities produced by the mind/brain. They are different, however, in that the term`cognitive map' usually refers to a cognitive map of a specific city, whereas the category`city' refers to a schema of a city or to a cognitive map of`city'. The suggestion here that a cognitive map of a specific city should be termed a specific or s-cognitive map, and the image of a city in general a categorical or c-cognitive map.
The notion of a c-cognitive map is reminiscent of Minsky's (1977) notion of`frame', Schank and Abelson's (1977) notion of`script', and Anderson's (1980) `event schema', all developed in artificial intelligence (AI) in the 1970s and all having similar meaning. The notion of a c-cognitive map is also reminiscent of the long-discussed notion of schema (or schemata) öby Gestalt psychologists, by Bartlett (1932) in his book Remembering, by Lynch (1960) , by the above AI researchers, by Neisser's (1976) ecological perspective, by Johnson (1987) and Lakoff (1987) and by Medyckyj-Scott and Blades (1992) in relation to cognitive maps.
The c-cognitive map differs from the above terms in several respects: first, whereas the above notions refer to memory in general, c-cognitive map refers to memory for extended space. The very same reasons that justify a distinction between`memory' and a cognitive map as a specific kind of memory, also justify the distinction between frame, script, etc and c-cognitive map. Second, the above AI terms were formulated within the now criticized (Clancey, 1999) information-processing approach paradigm, whereas the notion of a c-cognitive map was formed by a conjunction between embodied cognition and Haken's (1996) synergetic self-organization theory of brain functioning and cognition. Third, the usage of the notion schema in this paper is related, on the one hand, to Johnson and Lakoff's link between schemata and (nonclassical or embodied) categories, and on the other, to Bartlett's approach that provides the paradigmatic case study for the notion of SIRN (Haken, 1996; Haken and Portugali, 1996; Portugali, 1996; 2002) . The notion of a c-cognitive map stems from this perspective; the aim is not to suggest a new name for schemata, but to say that some cognitive maps have a category-like form (and as such are related to schemata) whereas others have an s-cognitive map form. Such a distinction is needed in light of the fact (Kitchin and Blades, 2002 ) that the notion`cognitive map' is highly contested.
Self-continuity in the production of cities
The phenomenon of`self-continuity' typifies the production of artifacts in general. A particularly nice example comes from the production of lamps that like cities are of very ancient origin. The oil lamp in figure 1 (top right) (over), for example, is from the Middle Bronze Age (some 3750 years ago). Nowadays, however, the term`lamp' refers mainly to electric lamps, but we still have oil lamps here and there. The archaeological record teaches us that, as with many other artifacts, the evolution of lamps is typified by morphological continuity and self-similarity: lamps that are morphologically similar to each other tend to be close in time and space. This property, which is particularly prominent with ceramic artifacts, provided the basis to Petrie's (1904) notion of relative chronology. Figure 1 graphically illustrates the process of the production of lamps. It starts with a certain lamp 1 that already exists in the world. Potter 1 looks at the lamp and internalizes its form in his or her memory. Potter 1's memory (mind/brain) then sends orders to his or her hands that then produce lamp 2 and so on. Note, first, that lamps 1 and 2 are mediated by potter 1's mind/body, lamps 2 and 3 by potter 2's mind/body, and so on. Second, that because each pair in the sequence of lamps is mediated by a potter's mind/body, there is always a possibility for a copying mistake ö what Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) have termed`cultural mutation'. Third, we have here a play between ad-hoc internal and external representations that emerge in the production process: the externally represented lamp 1 becomes an internal representation in potter 1's mind and the basis for potter 1's external representation in the form of lamp 2 that then becomes an internal representation in potter 2's mind, and so on, in a play between internal and external representations.
A similar process takes place in the production of cities, but with differences resulting from the fact that`a city is not a lamp'ölike a lamp it is an artifact, but unlike a lamp, it is a very large artifact. This quantitative size difference between a small artifact, such as a lamp, and a large one, such as a city, entails some qualitative differences with regard to the city as an internal and external representation. Because of its size, the city can never be perceived by the senses in its entirety. Hence its internally represented cognitive map in the brain is constructed by a multiplicity of means: direct sensory input information and indirect inputs, such as maps, texts, and inference. As a consequence, a person's cognitive map of a city is often distorted (Tversky, 1996) ; in other cases it is essentially a schema, a concept, or a category. For the very same reason, that is, because of its size and complexity, the city can never be constructed in its entirety by an act of a single person, planner, or groups of planners. Rather, its externally represented form and structure are constructed by a multiplicity of agents, each operating according to its, often distorted, schema, or cognitive map (and other forms of information) of the city. The city is a genuine self-organizing system (Portugali, 1999) .
In order to study such urban processes, I devised (Portugali, 1996) a set of experiments termed city games. A city game can be described as a group dynamic that involves some forty to seventy participants. Their aim is to build a city on a floor, representing the site for a new city. Each player in the game is given a 1:100 mock-up of a building, and in his or her turn is asked to locate it in the virtual city on the floor, in what he or she considers as the best location for that building. In a typical game (figure 2), the players observe the city as it develops, and in the process also learn the spontaneously emerging order on the ground. It is typical in such games that, after a few initial iterations, an observable urban order emerges. The participants internalize this emerging order and tend to locate their buildings in line with it. As can be seen, the main features of such a game are a sequential interplay between internal and external representations, the emergence of a collective complex city as an artifact, and a typical synergetic process of self-organization. These features are the main ingredients of the SIRN that is suggested below. It must be emphasized that the city game is not intended to be a 1:1 description of reality, but an illustration of the dynamics of cities as dual self-organizing systems (see definition below), that is, of the play between internal representations that originate in the mind/brain of agents and external representations that are created by means of self-organization as a collective product on the floor. The general principles of such an SIRN dynamics are thus at work in small as well as in large cities, when agents add new buildings to a city (as in the game), as well as in many other urban domainsöfor example, when urban agents (householders, firms, etc) attempt to rent a flat or an office and so on.
Conceptual and methodological obstacles
The above view on the dynamic of cities as a play between internally represented cognitive maps of agents and the resultant externally represented consequences of their acts is absent from the majority of urban theory and modeling, on the one hand, Figure 2. Four snapshots from a recently played city game. This game included a new rule not applied before:`each building must be connected to the city's road network'. That is, a player can locate a new building either along an existing road, or else he or she must add an access road to the new building.
and cognitive geography, on the other. The question is, why? Why do the vast majority of urban studies refrain from integrating cognitive science's principles into their theories and why do cognitive scientists and cognitive geographers refrain from the study of artifactsösmall like lamps and large like cities? The question is even more puzzling in light of the fact that most theories and studies of cities make implicit or explicit assumptions about human cognition and behavior. In economic-oriented theories and simulation models, for example, it is the somewhat arbitrary and axiomatic assumption about homo economicus. In fact, one of the aims for geographers to enter the domain of cognition in general and cognitive mapping in particular was to improve their theories and models by replacing the oversimplistic homo economicus that underlies their theories of cities with a more realistic, empirically supported view on human spatial behavior. And yet, this aim was never achieved; gradually cognitive approaches and the study of the dynamics of cities departed from each other. Tracing the history of this process in geography, Gold (1992) suggested that it is high time for reintegration. Two conceptual^methodological obstacles stand in the way of such a project, however. The first is related to the specific histories of cognitive science and the study of cities, and the second to the scientific status of artifacts.
Cognitive science and the study of cities
The paradigmatic shift that gave rise to cognitive science in the mid-1950s was associated with a split between the`old' humanistic cognitive studies and the new scientific cognitive science ' (Gardner, 1987) . At the center of the hermeneutic cognitive studies stand the products of human labor and imagination. That is, artifacts such as externallanguages, artworks, the economy, society, and so on. The common approach here is to interpret artifacts as a representation of society and the process of their production as part of the process of social reproduction. The common approach in cognitive science, per contra, is to treat the environment with its artifacts as essentially external to the cognitive systemöstimuli or cues that act on the mind/brain, that in its turn encodes the stimuli, processes them by means of its innate cognitive capabilities, and then produces response or behavior. A similar effect followed the paradigmatic changes that took place in human geography and urban studies in the early 1970s (Gregory, 1994) : the study of cities was divided between the`soft', hermeneutic, social-theory-oriented urban studies, and the`hard' analytical quantitative human geography and`regional science'. Thus, in social geography, the city is treated as a representation of society, while its dynamics and the urban process as a whole are treated as significant components in the process of sociospatial reproduction. On the other hand, regional scientists and`quantitative' urban geographers tend to derive the city from a set of postulates that are assumed to represent basic human needs and behaviors. By so doing they follow, albeit implicitly, Simon's approach to artifacts.
The scientific status of artifacts
In his The Science of the Artificial, Simon (1981) suggests how the study of artifacts can become a science. The difficulty in such a project is that, unlike natural sciences where one can distinguish between the natural cause and the artificial effect, here the causeö that is, human behavioröis itself an artifact and thus outside the domain of the sciences. Simon's solution is to claim that the innate needs and motives for action of animals and humans are rather few and simple and that the complexity exhibited by their behavior represents the complexity of the environment within which they act. This is the logic behind the assumption of homo economicus as well as behind recent agentbased and cellular automata urban simulation studies. They take it for granted that an agent's innate behavior and needs are simple and that an agent's complex behavior and the complexity of the city itself are emergent properties. The problem is that recent self-organization approaches to human behavior (adhered to by many urban simulation modelers) falsify Simon's assertion: they indicate that innate behavior is complex (Haken, 1996; Kelso, 1995; Portugali, 2002; 2003) .
Cognitive geography that emerged in the mid-1970s has developed more as a branch of cognitive science than as part of human geography. Accordingly, cognitive geographers tend to treat the city as a set of external stimuli and cues that act on the mind/ brain, which encodes and processes the various cues and then responds by spatial behavior in the city. The question of how this spatial behavior participates in urban processes and how the latter shape and reshape individuals' minds is considered an artifact, that is, a`nonscientific' issue, methodologically external to the natural cognitive process. The notion of SIRN that is introduced next was specifically designed as an approach to cognition and cognitive mapping that relates cognition and spatial behavior to the dynamics of cities, and admits the complexity of urban agents and the city as a self-organizing system.
SIRN (Synergetic Inter-Representation Networks)
As described in section 2.3, cognitive mapping studies started within the methodological frame of classical cognitivism that dominated cognitive science until the mid-1970s. This approach assumes a complete separation between brain/mind, on the one hand, and bodily action, on the other. As illustrated in figure 3(a) , cognitive processes such as perception are treated as conceptually separate from bodily action. More recently we have seen a shift toward the pragmatist embodied cognition approaches, according to which bodily action is part of the cognitive system. Hence the notion of perception^action [ figure 3(b) ].
SIRN can be seen as an extension of the action^perception view. It starts from the observation that the new developments that emphasize embodied cognition, actionp erception, and task specificity, also imply the`legitimization' of artifacts. Bodily artifacts, such as talking, grabbing, walking, etc, are regarded by these approaches as integral elements of the cognitive process itself. Within this context, Gibson (1979, page 40, figure 3 .1) has shown that, in some tasks, stand-alone artifacts, such as tools, function as an extension to the body. SIRN adds to the latter that, in certain tasks and Figure 3 . Three approaches to the interrelationships between perception, action, and production: (a) classical cognitivism öperception is independent from action and production; (b) embodied cognition öperception and action form a single system independent from production; (c) Synergetic Inter-Representation Networks: perception, action, and production form a single cognitive system. contexts, stand-alone artifacts and the process of their production function not only as an extension to the body, but also as an extension to the mind. In these cases, the cognitive process and system includes perception, action, and production [ figure 3(c) ]. The case studies and experiments presented above in section 2.4 and figures 1 and 2 are examples of such SIRN processes.
The term SIRN (Haken and Portugali, 1996) is an integration of two notions: synergetics, which is Haken's (1983) theory of self-organizing systems: and InterRepresentation Network, which is an approach to cognitive mapping proposed by Portugali (1996; 2002) . The suggestion in SIRN that cognition should be viewed in terms of action^perception^production, as in figure 3(c) , is based on the following set of propositions. First, humans come to the world with a capability for internal and external representations, when the latter includes representations that are stand-alone artifacts. Second, many cognitive processes, cognitive mapping included, evolve as an interaction between internal and external representations. The production of lamps as presented above is one example; another and more complex example is the production of cities. Third, artifacts, including cities and the many artifacts of which they are composed, enfold and convey quantitative Shannonian information and qualitative semantic information (Haken and Portugali, 2003) . Fourth and as a consequence of the above, the boundaries of the cognitive system should be perceived as distinct from the boundaries of the brain (the skull) and the body (skin), with the implication that, in cases of external bodily representations, the boundaries of the cognitive system extend beyond the brain/skull and include the whole body, and stand-alone artifacts in the environment. Fifth, the cognitive system is a self-organizing system, the dynamics of which is captured by Haken's synergetic approach to self-organization. Originating in physics in the domain of laser and fluid dynamics, Haken's synergetics was extended and applied to several research domains, including cognition and brain functioning (Haken, 1996) . According to synergetics, the brain/mind, cognition, cognitive mapping, and the interaction between internal and external representations as above, are all self-organizing systems that evolve in line with the principles of synergetics. The study, Self-organization and the City (Portugali, 1999) , shows that the city is a dual self-organizing system: each agent operating in the city is a complex self-organizing system on a local scale, and the city as a whole is a complex self-organizing system on a global scale.
The basic SIRN model and its three submodels
The basic SIRN model is presented in figure 4 . It can be seen as symbolizing a selforganizing active agent that is subject to internal information from the mind/brain in the form of ideas, fantasies, dreams, thoughts, and the like, and external information from the environment via the senses, the agent's body, and/or stand-alone artifacts. The interaction between these two flows gives rise to an order parameter that governs the agent's action and behavior, as well as the feedback information flow to the agent's mind. The order parameters are determined by a competition in line with the synergetics' pattern-recognition paradigm noted above.
In order to apply the basic SIRN model to specific case studies, we reformulated it (Haken and Portugali, 1996) in terms of three prototype submodels corresponding to the three action^perception^production processes. They are the intrapersonal, the interpersonal collective, and the interpersonal with a common reservoir submodels. The first two submodels can be exemplified by the cognitive process used in the production of a lamp (figure 1). The intrapersonal process might refer to cases where the potter is working alone, and the interpersonal to cases where several potters are engaged in the production of a certain type of lamp, or other small-scale artifacts. Our main concern here, however, is with the third submodel.
In the intrapersonal and interpersonal submodels, the process depends fully on the biological memories of individuals. In the interpersonal with a common reservoir submodel, the process depends partly on biological memories, as before, but partly also on externalized nonbiological memory, that we term a common reservoir. This common reservoir of external, artificial, and nonbiological memory might take the form of texts, the Internet, buildings, or whole cities. The dynamics of such a process is nicely illustrated by the set of city-game experiments presented above in section 2.4 and figure 2. Figure 5 (over) illustrates graphically this public-collective SIRN submodel with respect to the city game. Each individual player or agent is subject to internal input constructed by the mind/brain, and external input that is coming from the city as a common reservoir. The internal input refers to the agent's past urban experience and can thus take the form of intentions, needs, and c-cognitive or s-cognitive map, and the external input refers to the legible information afforded by the city on the ground. The interaction between these two forms of input gives rise to a competition between alternative cognitive maps and decision rules that ends up when one, or a few, alternative(s)`wins'. The winning alternative is the order parameter that enslaves the system. The emerging order parameter governs an external output, which is the agent's location action in the city, and an internal output, which is an information feedback loop back to the agent's mind/brain. The agent's individual actions enter into interaction that gives rise to a competition between several urban configurations. The wining configuration emerges as the city's global order parameter that in its turn`enslaves' the minds of the individual agents, and so on. In the language of synergetics, this process is termed circular causality. In terms of social theory, it is close to notions of sociospatial reproduction and structuration (Giddens, 1984; Gregory, 1994) . Because of circular causality, as the process evolves, the subjective cognitive maps of the individual agents become more similar to each other, and an intersubjective, collective cognitive map(s) emerges. Both private^subjective cognitive maps and public^collective ones are thus constructions. The process thus involves the two-scale self-organization process noted above: an individual^local scale referring to each individual agent as a self-organizing system, and a collective^global scale, referring to the whole city as a self-organizing system.
One of the attractions of SIRN is its potential to participate in both of Snow's (1964) two culturesöin`soft' social-theory-derived discourse on cities, as well as iǹ hard' mathematical/computational urban simulation models. And indeed, the notion of SIRN has already been applied to Haken's (1996) study on The Principles of Brain Functioning to discussions concerning the nature of cities, their evolution in space and time (Portugali, 1999) , to a study on the nature of human agents' decisionmaking in the contexts of planning and cities (Portugali, 1999) , to information in the urban landscape Figure 4 . The basic Synergetic Inter-Representation Networks model symbolizes a self-organizing agent that is subject to two forms of information: internal and external, and is actively constructing two forms of information, again internal and external (source: Portugali, 2002) . (Haken and Portugali, 2003) , but not, or at least not explicitly, to urban simulation models. The aim of the next section is thus to discuss the implications of SIRN for urban simulation modeling.
Implications for urban simulation models
The discussion in this section will focus on the conjunction between agent-based (AB) and cellular automata (CA) models that currently provides the prevalent approach to simulate urban dynamics (Benenson and Torrens, 2004) . A case in point is the family of FACS (Free Agents on a Cellular Space) models that forms the core of Self-organization and the City (Portugali, 1999, page 75^220) . Such urban simulation models are conventionally built of two sets of entities: agents that mimic households, landowners, firms, and similar`thinking entities' operating in the city, and infrastructure objects referring to the city, its parcels of land, roads, neighborhoods, land-use patterns, functional areas, and the like. Like urban theory in general, the majority of such models are essentially not cognitive. The discussion below will explore the possibility of a cognitive approach to urban modeling by studying the implications of the SIRN public with a common reservoir submodel to the basic components of AB/CA urban simulation models: for agents, for infrastructure objects, and for the overall model dynamics; the discussion will close with an example. 
City Figure 5 . The`interpersonal with a common reservoir' Synergetic Inter-Representation Networks submodel applied to the city game. c-CM is a c-cognitive map, s-CM an s-cognitive map, and a prime indicates a map after feedback; L is location; and A is information afforded by the city.
Implications for agents
Agents never come to the city with a tabula rasa. In`conventional' AB/CA models they usually come equipped with needs, patterns of decisionmaking, intentions, and similar information that allow them to interact locally with their nearest neighbors in a bottomup manner. According to SIRN, by contrast, agents perceive the city globally in a top-down manner and on the basis of this perception they then act locally (as usual). They must, therefore, come to the city equipped also with information regarding its global structureöeither in the form of an s-cognitive map, or in the form of a c-cognitive map. Note that the c-cognitive map refers to the global and mezzo-structure (neighborhoods, etc) of the city, whereas the s-cognitive map refers to the city's global, mezzo, and local-scale structure. In an empirical study currently under way. Hetna et al (2001) have examined subjects' c-cognitive maps. Their findings indicate that most subjects tend to have either monocentric c-cognitive maps, or polycentric ones. In line with these findings, in the example presented below, we assume two polar c-cognitive maps that agents have in mind: monocentric, referring to a hierarchical core^periphery image schema of the city; and polycentric referring to a nonhierarchical schema of the city. A convenient way to refer to the monocentric^polycentric dichotomy is by means of the relations between size and rank that were often used to describe the structure and hierarchy of systems (Zipf, 1949) , including urban systems (Batty and Longley, 1994; Haggett et al, 1977) . Thus, assuming a city hierarchically subdivided (categorized) into areas of different sizes and types, its structure can be described by the relation A r A 1 (r)
Àb , where A is the size of an area, r its rank, and b is a constant that must be estimated. Given such a description of the city, an agent with a monocentric c-cognitive map perceives the city as a concave rank^size distribution with b, or rather b c % 2, whereas an agent with a polycentric map perceives the city as a convex rank^size distribution with b c % 0X5.
Agents take decisions on the basis of their s-cognitive and c-cognitive maps of the city. This property is significant because, as specified below in section 5.3, it implies a process that differs from the standard AB/CA modeling approaches currently prevalent in the domain of urban simulation: instead of the bottom-up process that typifies standard urban simulation models, a top-down/bottom-up process in which the agents think' about the city globally but act in it and on it locally.
Specific and c-cognitive maps are interrelated. This was illustrated above in connection with figure 5 that describes an agent coming for the first time to a new city. From its past experience, this agent is, say, monocentric. With this knowledge in mind, our agent observes, learns, and perceives the city. The result of this learning is the agent's s-cognitive map of that city which is an interpretation of the city structure by means of the agent's initial c-cognitive map. Because of hysteresis and similar effects of systematic distortions in cognitive mapping, it is not unlikely that our agent's s-cognitive map will be somewhat distorted. It all depends on the degree of resemblance between the agent's c-cognitive map and the real structure of the city.
An agent's cognitive map of the city is not an exact copy of its real structure in yet another way. Because of the large size of cities, an agent's information about the city is always partial and never homogeneous: some parts and elements of the city are better known than others; some are known in detail, others in general terms, and others are not known at all. The often distorted and partial nature of cognitive maps is significant for the dynamics of cities because agents take decisions, behave, and act in the city according to their cognitive map of it and not according to the`real' structure of the city (however determined).
Agents constantly categorize the city. They do so by means of the interactive play between the s-cognitive and c-cognitive maps with which they come to the city, the affordable and legible information they actively extract from the city, and their behavior and action in the city, that is, by means of the task-specific and context-dependent play between internal and external representations that evolves in line with the public with common reservoir SIRN submodel described above. This iterative process of categorization and recategorization gives rise to the infrastructural categories of the model.
Implications for infrastructural categories
In ordinary,`noncognitive', urban simulation models the global structure of the city is not an active participant in the dynamics. Usually it is an outcomeöan emergent urban structure or property of the local interactions between the agents and the local urban elements ö usually cells that symbolize city lots. In a SIRN/cognitive urban simulation model the global structure of the city is from the start an active participant. This is because, as noted above, upon their first arrival to the city agents perceive the city globally, by means of their c-cognitive maps; then they construct their s-cognitive maps by comparing their c-cognitive maps to the real structure of the city they confront and only then, on the basis of this global perception, do they act on the city locallyö by their location decision and action. To enable agents to do so, in each new model iteration the global structure of the city must be redefined in a way comparable with the agents' cognitive maps, which in the present case is the monocentric^polycentric dichotomy and its description by means of the rank^size rule. The latter can take the form A r A 1 (r) Àb , as above, or other forms that are discussed in the appendix. From this follow three basic global urban patterns:
Monocentric concave`primate' pattern: b 5 2. Polycentric convex pattern: b`1. Hierarchical rank^size pattern: b % 1. At each model iteration the global structure of the city must be redefined and with it each of the areas and subareas of which the city is composed. Using the language of classical location theory, an area can be defined as a central place plus the periphery it influences, when the range öthe spatial extent of the periphery, is some function of the central place's intensity. Areas are commonly classified into residential, commercial, industrial, and so on. In some (polycentric) cities they coexist in nonhierarchical relations whereas in others they form a (monocentric) hierarchical structure. In the latter case, the city as a whole can be regarded as the area at the top of the hierarchy, its districts as subareas, and so on. The same applies to the city's central places: a small city with a single central place might evolve into a complex hierarchical structure at the top of which is the city's main central place (its CBD), below it smaller scale subcentral places, and so on down the hierarchy.
As in every AB/CA urban simulation model, here too, the cells are the elementary infrastructure objects. A cell might be empty or occupied (`full'). It also has properties that reflect the entity that`fills' the cell and its relations to its neighbors. Each cell might also be a member of one or several of the above larger scale urban objects that form the city structure. Each iteration, the empty/full/content/membership state of every cell in the system is determined anew in line with predetermined transition rules, as is usual in such models.
Implications for the overall model dynamics
Standard AB/CA urban simulation models are essentially bottom-up in their structure. A typical scenario in such models starts, for example, when agents arrive at a city, select the empty cells, evaluate the appropriateness of the cells and their nearest neighbors in light of their needs, and then take a decision and action. In parallel, the properties of every cell are determined according to its relations to its nearest neighbors. This is described in figure 6 (left). As illustrated in figure 6 (right), a SIRN/cognitive urban simulation model is characterized by an on-going interaction between top-down and bottom-up processes: a typical scenario starts top-down when an agent arrives at the city with a global cognitive map in its mind, compares it to the global structure of the city, and selects a local area. Now starts the bottom-up process: the agent selects the empty cells in that local area, evaluates the appropriateness of the cells and their nearest neighbors in light of its needs, and then takes a decision and action. In parallel, the properties of every cell are determined according to its relations to its nearest neighbors and so on.
In a regular AB/CA simulation the process ends here: the global outcome is recorded or mapped as the output of this specific iteration and the model is ready for a new iteration. In a SIRN model the process continues and feeds back to the global structure of the city that allows the top-down process in the next iteration. First, the state of the various central places is determined. Second, peripheries are determined around central places. Third, areas are defined or redefined. Fourth, subareas are redefined. Fifth, given areas and subareas, the global state of the city as a whole, and its rank^size structure b, are defined as above. These changes redefine the local membership state of each cell in the various infrastructure objects and become the externally representated input for a new agent in the next iteration, and so on in circular causality.
An example
The following example is taken from CogCity (Cognitive City)öan AB/CA urban simulation model constructed in line with the above SIRN principles. (More details of CogCity are described in the appendix). It must be emphasized at the outset that CogCity, currently in its final stages of development, is specifically designed to investigate the various aspects of the interrelations between cognition and city dynamics. Needless to say, the presentation of the model in full, and of the above-noted investigation, go beyond the scope of the present discussion; both will have to await a different paper. The purpose of presenting the model here in its preliminary form is therefore rather modest: to demonstrate that a cognitive approach to urban simulation models is possible and to allow a general impression of its characteristics.
The specific question the model intends to address is this: How is the three-dimensional architectural landscape of a city created? Given this question, the agents can be imagined as immigrants coming to a new city for the first time`in their life', with an intention to construct in it a certain building they`have in mind'. Every model iteration, a new agent enters the city and attempts to locate in it that specific building. Some of the agents have a residential building in mind whereas others have a commercial building in mind. In the present example we assume that 10% of the agents intend to build a commercial building and 90% a residential building and that residential buildings are 1^3 stories high, whereas commercial buildings are 5^7 stories high.
In addition to a building, each of the agents has`in mind' a c-cognitive map b c of`a city' that represents the agent's past urban experience. In the complete CogCity model, some of the agents have in mind a monocentric c-cognitive map of a city, whereas others a polycentric one. In the scenario described below all agents arriving at the city have monocentric c-cognitive maps only. The agents construct their s-cognitive maps b s of the city by comparing their b c with the city's b. The result of this process is agents with monocentric and polycentric cognitive maps, with residential and commercial buildings in mind, and with four location decisions and action patterns that are specified in the appendix. Figure 7 describes four snapshots from the scenario as it develops on the screen. The large map on the right in each case shows how the built-up landscape of the city evolves, when the two darkest gray colors indicate commercial buildings of 5 and 7 stories high, and the two lighter gray colors indicate residential buildings of 1 and 3 stories high, respectively. The upper-left map shows the parallel evolution of central places and the bottom-left map shows the evolution of areas. The whole process is described in graph form in figure 8 (over). Figure 8(a) shows the evolution of the city's b, that is, its evolving rank^size distribution, and figure 8(c) the hierarchical structure of the cityöthe evolution of hierarchical levels of areas, first-degree subareas, second-degree subareas, and so on. As can be seen, the number of agents with monocentric cognitive maps at first declines but later increases and stabilizes to become the agents' most dominant s-cognitive map. Figure 8(d) shows changes in the number of residential and commercial buildings in the city.
As noted above, CogCity is not yet complete and was brought in here to demonstrate that a cognitive approach to urban simulation models is possible and to allow a general impression. The latter will be done by presenting a few preliminary results. First, looking at the main map of figure 7, one can see that the cognitive considerations operating in CogCity give rise to an`ordinary' city form with dominant centers, subcenters, residential their c-cognitive map and the real structure of the city. Further insight into this process can be gained by looking at the evolving parameter b in figure 8(a), in relation to the evolving s-cognitive maps in figure 8(c). The simulation starts with all agents having monocentric c-cognitive and s-cognitive maps. Then as a consequence of spatial cognitive dissonance the relative number of agents with monocentric s-cognitive maps decreases and the number of agents with multicentric s-cognitive maps increases. This trend continues up to about iteration 3500 after which the pendulum swing changes again and the city with the s-cognitive map of the majority of its inhabitants becomes monocentric. In terms of synergetics, we can interpret the above process as a competition between two order parameters ömonocentric and polycentric. This competition ends when the monocentric order parameter of the city`wins' and enslaves the perception, behavior, and action of the city's inhabitants. Finally, it is interesting to note, in figure 7 (bottom-left maps), that the agents with monocentric and polycentric cognitive maps are spatially segregated. That is, the above process of self-organization in CogCity gave birth to a potentially new cultural group in the city.
Concluding remarks
As noted at the outset, the aim of this paper is to initiate a discussion concerning the potential of a cognitive approach to cities. The next steps will include, first, the development of CogCity into a full-scale and comprehensive urban simulation model and, second, the elaboration of some of the issues that were only touched upon here but deserve a much fuller discussion. One such issue concerns cognitive heuristics versus rational economic considerations in decisionmaking in general and in the context of cities in particular. A possible starting point here might be Tversky and Kahneman's (1981) studies on cognitive heuristics in decisionmaking and their synergetic extension and interpretation by Haken and Portugali (1999) . The basic challenge here would be to develop an urban simulation model the agents of which take decisions in line with Tversky and Kahneman's heuristics and their synergetic extension or interpretation. Another such issue follows the similarity noted above between core, periphery, etc, as embodied cognitive models in line with Johnson and Lakoff's embodied cognition approach, and the same concepts as they appear in classical location theory. This similarity raises an Occam's razor question: Does the universality of embodied cognitive models (that in this respect can be treated as`innate') make the economic location models secondary, that is, specific realizations of the more basic models? Or are the two sets of models independent of each other and thus in the context of cities do they reinforce each other? A third issue might refer to the methodological implications of the fact that innate behavior is from the start complex. This might require adding to the currently bottom-up urban simulation models a strong top-down component and developing them as genuinely dual self-organization models. The CogCity model preliminarily introduced above can be seen as a first step toward this aim.
